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People often encounter conflicting information on a wide array of topics. How
they evaluate this information in relation to their current beliefs, and the effects of other
influences, such as the weight given to superficial aspects of the information (e.g.,
pictures, anecdotes, or jargon that are at most minimally related to an author’s argument),
has been of interest to researchers for many years. One component of their processing
and evaluation of this information is their memory for the information. This study set out
to examine the following questions: (1) Is belief-congruent information remembered
better or worse than belief incongruent information? (2) Does the addition of superficial
scientific information to belief-congruent or belief-incongruent information influence
how well the newly presented information is remembered? (3) Does repeated testing have
an effect on memory for the information? (4) Do any of these factors elicit a greater
number of memory intrusions in a free recall task?
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CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction
People commonly encounter conflicting information on a wide array of topics.
This information can relate to any number of political, scientific, or social issues.
Sometimes this information can be on contentious political topics such as abortion or the
deterrent effects of the death penalty. Other times it can be of a scientific nature, dealing
with issues such as evolution or whether direct instruction is a superior teaching method
to discovery learning. These topics may be of high importance to an individual, such as
whether daycare is as good for a young child as home care by a parent. Alternatively,
these topics may be of low importance to an individual, such as whether increased risktaking behavior in firemen leads to better job performance. How people evaluate such
conflicting information, and the resilience of people’s conclusions once they are formed,
have been of interest to cognitive, social psychological, and educational researchers for
many years, and have recently captured the attention of several neuroscientists. What
such researchers often find is that people use numerous heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts,
when evaluating such information.
Oftentimes these cognitive shortcuts are thought of in terms of the general
population’s failure to apply or understand concepts relating to statistics and probability
when making decisions or judgments concerning uncertain events. These shortcuts can be
1

broken down into heuristics relating to representativeness, availability, and anchoring
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Yet, in a broader sense, one can also include additional
factors that have been shown to influence how people make decisions and evaluate
information. Among the well-established factors within social psychology are
commitment and consistency, reciprocity, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity
(Cialdini, 1984; 1993). However, other factors have been examined as well. These
include the value attributed to seductive details, which in some cases may serve as a
proxy for authority as may be the case in instances of superficial yet meaningless
scientific information (Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008), and biases
due to one’s current beliefs, desires, or opinions. Such factors as those mentioned above
appear to not only be found in undergraduate college students and adult participants that
respond to ads in a paper - the two groups that usually provide the data for such research but also those with advanced levels of education, such as law students and graduate
students in political science presented with new information for controversial topics
outside their respective areas of expertise (Wiley, 2005), as well as those that have been
trained to think analytically and scientifically, such as medical school faculty, research
psychologists, and students in advanced level cognitive science courses (Reich et al.,
2006; Weisberg et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 1993).

Seductive Details
Interesting or entertaining pieces of information with little if any relevance to the
theme, topic, or point of the information being presented can affect the evaluation of new
information. These kinds of additions to information are known as seductive details
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(Harp & Mayer, 1998; Weisberg et al., 2008). Presumably seductive details work by
priming individuals to organize what they are about to learn around irrelevant prior
knowledge (Harp & Mayer, 1998), by disrupting the deeper processing necessary to
organize and integrate new information into a coherent mental model (Mayer, Griffith,
Jurkowitz, & Rothman, 2008), or by some combination of the above. Regardless though,
their general effects are as follows: they make people perceive information as more
interesting (Weisberg et al., 2008), despite decreasing their retention for the material
(Harp & Mayer, 1998), as well as their ability to apply the newly learned information
(Harp & Mayer, 1998; Mayer, et al., 2008).
For example, by adding information about lightning related deaths to a passage on
how lightning occurs, Harp and Mayer (1998) demonstrated that seductive details could
decrease memory for relevant information and the ability of individuals to answer critical
thinking questions pertaining to the material, such as the relationship between
temperature and lightning or why lightning may be absent despite the presence of clouds.
These effects were not mitigated by such study aids as the highlighting of relevant
passages or providing participants with a list of learning objectives. In a related study,
Weisberg et al., (2008) showed that by adding irrelevant neuroscientific information,
which arguably carries a greater air of authority, to a weak explanation for psychological
phenomena, they could elicit higher satisfaction for the weak explanation from
individuals without any training in psychology or neuroscience, as well as from
individuals in an intermediate level cognitive neuroscience class.
However, other studies do suggest that the effects of seductive details may be
more complicated than simply whether they are present or absent. Most notably, the
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putative detrimental effect of seductive details on memory is not always found (Mayer et
al., 2008; Rowland et al., 2008). In a pair of experiments in which participants were
presented with information on viruses or the digestive system, seductive details
concerning the effect of sex on the immune system or how to safely swallow a sword
were found to decrease subsequent problem solving ability for questions related to
viruses and the digestive system respectively, but had no influence on retention for those
topics (Mayer et al., 2008). One possible reason for why the negative effects of seductive
details on memory are not always found may have to do with the placement of the
seductive details. This has been indicated by Rowland et al. (2008), who found that
seductive details in the form of fabricated stories about Sigmund Freud wetting his bed,
having trouble with women, and having a subtly Oedipal relationship with his mother,
only decreased memory for information about his psychosexual stages of development if
this unrelated information was presented early in a text on the Freudian psychosexual
stages of development as opposed to late in the text.

Motivated Reasoning
Additionally, what researchers often find is that people seldom process
information independently of their beliefs (Boysen & Vogel, 2007; Boysen & Vogel,
2008; Corner, Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2012; Harris, Sheth, & Cohen, 2007; Hastorf &
Cantril, 1954; Jones & Russell, 1980; Levine & Murphy, 1943; Lord, Lepper, & Preston,
1984; Lord, Ross, & Lepper 1979; Plous 1991; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, &
Hamann, 2006) or personal motivations (Bastardi, Uhlman, & Ross, 2011). Instead, what
such research demonstrates is that people often evaluate information in a biased manner.
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Generally, many people seem to experience some kind of inherent cognitive difficulty in
evaluating new information in an unbiased manner (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980;
Bastardi, Uhlman, & Ross, 2011; Boysen & Vogel, 2007; Boysen & Vogel 2008; Corner
et al., 2012; Jones & Russell, 1980; Levine & Murphy, 1943; Lord et al., 1984; Lord et
al., 1979 1979; Masnick & Zimmerman, 2009; Munro, Leary, & Lasane, 2004; Munro
2010; Plous, 1991; Reich, Green, Brock, & Tetlock, 2006; Russell & Jones, 1980;
Wilson, DePaulo, Mook, & Klaaren, 1993), and may in fact work unknowingly to distort
evidence that conflicts with their beliefs, or misremember what their beliefs were prior to
encountering conflicting evidence as a means to better align evidence and belief (Jones &
Russell, 1980; Kuhn, 1989; Munro, Leary, & Lasane, 2004), even when explicitly
instructed to attempt to be unbiased (Lord et al., 1984). Some of the factors that influence
information processing include personal biases due to current beliefs (Boysen & Vogel,
2007; Boysen & Vogel, 2008; Corner et al ., 2012; Jones & Russell, 1980; Levine &
Robinson, 1943; Lord, et al., 1984; Lord et al., 1979; Munro et al., 2004; Plous, 1991),
perceived importance (Reich et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 1993), personal motivation
(Bastardi, Uhlman, & Ross, 2011), and just being asked to form an opinion on a topic
(Anderson, Lepper, & Ross 1980; Masnick & Zimmerman, 2009).
It has often been shown that when new information is consistent with an
individual’s current beliefs, biases, and desires, it will be rated more positively compared
to when it is not (Bastardi Uhlman, & Ross, 2011; Corner et al., 2012; Lord et al., 1979;
Munro et al., 2004). This can mean people will rate it as more obvious, more valid, more
publishable, or having been attained through better methods (Bastardi, Uhlman, & Ross,
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2011; Corner et al., 2012; Lord et al., 1979; Masnick & Zimmerman, 2009; Reich et al.,
2006; Wilson et al., 1993).
But why are people, including those who are presumably well educated or trained
to think more rationally or scientifically than the general population, so prone to such
cognitive mistakes when evaluating new information? Broadly speaking, it is because
information, scientific or not, is seldom processed in an intellectual vacuum. According
to Levine and Murphy (1943), how one perceives and learns is highly influenced by a
personal frame of reference shaped by an individual’s values, needs, and desires. Hastorf
and Cantril (1954) have argued that people selectively attend to, perceive, and remember
events from their environment as they are relevant to them, the observer/processor. Lord
et al. (1979) even suggest that individuals will routinely discredit or discount information
that contradicts a currently held belief and deem information of little or no probative
value if it does not support one’s view. In addition, they propose that when new
information is mixed or inconclusive, people of opposite views may assimilate it with
their current beliefs even when the content of the information does not warrant doing so.
Lord et al. (1979) investigated some of these ideas, in which participants with
strong views concerning the deterrent effects of the death penalty were presented with the
flawed conclusions of two fictitious studies with contradictory results. Participants in this
study first received the conclusion of one fictitious study, followed by a questionnaire to
evaluate the changes in their attitudes on the deterrent effects of the death penalty. They
were then given further details about the fictitious study, as well as criticisms and
rebuttals, which they were asked to evaluate. Once the evaluation was complete, they
received the conclusion of a second fictitious study that came to the opposite conclusion,
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and were put through the same procedure as they were for the first one. What was found
was that despite a momentary effect of “evidence” disconfirming their initial beliefs,
people evaluated the fictitious studies that agreed with their initial beliefs as more
convincing and better conducted; it was also found that inconclusive or mixed data could
lead to a greater polarization in one’s beliefs, although later research has indicated that
such arguably value-neutral information may have a stronger influence on those who
already hold an extreme position (Boysen & Vogel, 2007).
Personal motivation has been shown to influence how people process new
information through similar methods. In an experiment on how one’s motivations may
alter how one interprets the results of a scientific study, Bastardi et al., (2011) gave
couples likely to have children in the near future descriptions of two fictitious studies on
the effects of daycare and home care on the development of children. One fictitious study
concluded daycare had better effects on the development of children; the other fictitious
study indicated home care had better effects on the development of children. Prior to
participating in the study, the couples involved were preselected based on whether or not
they planned to put their future child in daycare. Half the couples involved had already
decided that one parent would remain at home with their future child; half were
conflicted about whether one parent should stay home or if their future child should be
sent to daycare. After reading the descriptions of the two fictitious studies, the couples
were asked to rate the design of the studies, list the strengths and weaknesses of each
study, and indicate which one they found to be more convincing. Not surprisingly,
conflicted couples rated the fictitious study in favor of daycare more positively, whereas
non-conflicted couples evaluated the fictitious study in favor of home care more
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positively. In post-experimental evaluations of daycare and home care, couples who were
initially conflicted about their decision of whether to send their future child to daycare or
not were subsequently less conflicted about their decision, thus showing a change in their
attitudes, presumably based on the biased assimilation of information from the article that
supported the use of day care; unconflicted couples on the other hand only showed a
marginal change in their attitudes towards daycare, likely because they were less
motivated to do so. These results led Bastardi et al. (2011) to conclude that their study
lends support to the notion that evaluations of scientific evidence can be influenced by
what one desires to be true, and not just what one already believes to be true.
In the experiments conducted by Lord et al. (1979) and Bastardi et al. (2011), the
topics used for evaluation were presumably of high importance to the participants that
evaluated the fictitious studies that were used. However, Anderson et al. (1980) and
Masnick and Zimmerman (2009) have both shown that it is not just topics for which
people already have strong biases, desires, or long held beliefs about that they may
evaluate in a biased manner. In Anderson et al. (1980), the researchers sought to find
whether participants would continue to support a theory about a topic they likely had not
previously contemplated, even if the minimal evidence they were given for the theory
was discredited; they also looked at whether making people provide their own
explanations for the relation between the two variables being examined by a study
claiming to lend support to the theory would increase their tendency to hold on to the
theory after it was discredited.
The topic in Anderson et al. (1980) was whether a proclivity for risk-taking
behavior would positively or negatively affect the job performance of firefighters.
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Participants in the experimental condition of this study were provided with weak
information leading to one of the two possible conclusions. Next they were asked to
generate a written explanation for why the relationship they were told about might exist.
Afterwards, some of the participants in the experimental condition were falsely debriefed
whereas others were not. During this false debriefing session, they were told that the
information they had initially been given was false. Finally, with the control group, they
were asked to fill out measures assessing their beliefs concerning the two variables and
the predictive power of the relationship.
What was found was that when subjects were provided with weak data, and not
debriefed, the weak data had a strong effect on their theories about the relationship
between risk-taking behavior and job performance by firefighters; Anderson et al. (1980)
also found that even when the participants were debriefed, the debriefing had little
influence on their beliefs about the relationship between the two variables. In fact, even
when there was a total refutation of the evidence upon which their belief was based, there
was still a strong relationship between the initial information and the subsequent belief.
This finding indicates that the participants failed to make revisions to their beliefs, even
in light of this new information, raising questions about the tenacity of beliefs in the real
world, given that such a complete discrediting of evidence rarely happens in the real
world (Anderson et al., 1980).
In a subsequent experiment Anderson et al. (1980) presented participants with
case studies highlighting a successful and an unsuccessful firefighter. Some were then
asked to write an explanation for the success or lack of success of the firefighters, while
others were not. Some from both groups were put through a false debriefing. All
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participants completed assessments of their beliefs on the topic. Again, what was found
was that exposure to the case studies had a powerful effect on later beliefs. It was shown
that these effects persisted even after the false debriefing in both those who were asked to
generate an explanation as well as in those who were not, although the relationship was
weaker for those who were not asked to generate an explanation. In this study, the
researchers concluded that people maintain beliefs with more tenacity than would be
expected even if the maintenance of their beliefs is not logically warranted, that one’s
initial beliefs on a topic may continue even when the evidence upon which they are based
is invalidated, and that the generation of causal explanations by an individual for a
relationship may strengthen the tenacity of such beliefs.
In a similar line of research, Masnick and Zimmerman (2009) also looked at how
people process information on a topic that is less politicized, and presumably one that
people have less ingrained or solidified opinions about compared to those typically used
in this line of research. In their study the topic was whether direct instruction was a better
method of instruction in early science education compared to discovery learning. They
gave their subjects brief descriptions of the issue. The subjects were then asked to
indicate which method of instruction they believed was more effective. They all then read
the same study and were asked to evaluate the study in terms of its methodological design
and the appropriateness of the sample. Afterwards, they were given one of four reports
with the findings either favoring direct instruction or discovery learning, and either
containing an explanation or not containing an explanation. When they were done
reading the conclusion they were given, participants were asked to rate the conclusion
based on obviousness, importance, and interestingness; they were also asked to evaluate
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the study for the appropriateness of the experimental design, measures, and the sample
used.
What Masnick and Zimmerman (2009) found was that when the initial beliefs of
participants were confirmed, they rated the methods of the experiment more positively;
when the participants’ initial beliefs were disconfirmed, they rated the methods of the
experiment more negatively. They also rated the study as more obvious and important
when their initial beliefs were confirmed. The ratings of obviousness for the conclusion
of the study were unaffected by the presence of an explanation or lack of an explanation.
Overall, it appears that beliefs and opinions can quickly form and be based on
minimal or vague information. Subsequently, once they do, they become quite resilient to
disconfirming information, even in the face of complete invalidation. Intuitively, one can
imagine why this might be the case for important topics such as those related to serious
medical issues, contentious political debates, or the early developmental environment of
one’s child, but it also appears to be the case with less important topics many people have
never thought about, such as what qualities make a good firefighter or whether one
method of science instruction is better than another. Yet, still, questions remain
concerning what cognitive or neurological processes underlie these patterns.
One prominent hypothesis for why so many people have such difficulty in
objectively assessing new information concerning their beliefs is that there are
unconscious ego-protective processes in place that help people maintain a sense of self
and reality, enhance self-esteem, and enhance their opinions of the groups to which they
belong, such as those pertaining to religion or social class (Klaczynski & Narasimham,
1998; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000). In fact, it has been shown that when beliefs are
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threatened through disconfirming evidence, people will report higher levels of emotional
arousal, as measured by the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist, which assesses
depression, anxiety, and hostility (Russell & Jones, 1980). A prominent example of this is
outlined in Festinger (1956) in which an end-of-the-world cult survived the date of their
predicted apocalypse and subsequently faced the ensuing cognitive dissonance. Several
cult members refused to accept the disconfirmation and re-interpreted the event as a
confirmation of their previously held beliefs.
A related hypothesis concerning the underlying mechanisms of motivated
reasoning that has been supported through fMRI studies is that when an individual
encounters evidence that may lead them to an emotionally aversive conclusion, such as a
political figure they respect being caught in a lie, areas of the brain associated with pain,
punishment, and negative affect (e.g., the insula and orbitofrontal cortex) exhibit greater
activation, whereas the reestablishment of prior beliefs through rationalization or the
presentation of redeeming information, such as an exonerating explanation for the
misunderstanding their respected political figure was involved in, is associated with the
activation of areas associated with reward (e.g., the ventral striatum and caudate nucleus).
According to such biological accounts, motivated reasoning is mediated by areas of the
brain involved in response conflict, implicit appraisal of emotionally threatening
information, and social and moral evaluation (e.g., the anterior cingulate cortex, the
ventral medial prefrontal cortex, and the posterior cingulate cortex; Harris et al., 2007;
Harris et al., 2009; Westen et al., 2006).
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Memory
A topic related to motivated reasoning is how various factors that have typically
been found to influence people’s analysis and interpretation of new information such as
belief-congruence, perceived importance, personal motivation, and superficial
information affect memory. A number of social factors have been shown to have an
effect on memory including social-cognitive, social-motivational, interpersonal, and
group and collective influences (Blank, 2009). Among the social cognitive influences
Blank (2009) describes are social-cognitive representations such as traits and stereotypes
that are remembered for behaviors, self-concept, and whether information is congruent or
incongruent with current attitudes. With regard to this last social-cognitive influence on
memory, there are questions concerning whether the congruence of new information with
current attitudes, beliefs, or opinions will influence how well it is remembered, or
whether certain aspects of it will be remembered better or differently than others.
Previous research has indicated that such factors indeed highly influence memory
on a range of topics including politics, sports, and pseudoscientific beliefs pertaining to
the paranormal, both in the lab and in real life (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Jones & Russell,
1980; Levine & Murphy 1943; Wiseman & Morris, 1995). Using small samples of
carefully selected students known for their reputations for either supporting or opposing
Communism, Levine and Murphy (1943) found the belief congruence of learned
information could correlate with that information being learned better and forgotten more
slowly.
Following a football game between Princeton and Dartmouth that was plagued by
controversy due to numerous penalties and a couple of well publicized injuries,
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researchers from both institutions surveyed students from both schools to gauge opinion
about the game, and showed samples from both populations a movie of the game, asking
them to note violations of the game’s rules and the severity of the violations. Although
both samples had similar levels of knowledge of and experience with football,
perceptions and memories of the game varied greatly between schools. Princeton students
overwhelmingly judged the game to be “rough and dirty,” as opposed to “clean and fair,”
largely believed that Dartmouth initiated the rough play, thought Dartmouth violated the
rules of the game twice as much as Princeton, and thought that Dartmouth’s infractions
were more severe than Princeton’s (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954, pp 130). Dartmouth students
also largely saw the game as “rough and dirty,” but were more likely to see both sides as
responsible for instigating the rough play, and saw both teams as violating the rules of the
game with equal frequency. These divergent interpretations and memories of the same
event led the researchers to conclude that people attend to, perceive, and remember
events not as they are but through a lens of personal relevance.
In an experiment in which participants that were either believers in or skeptics of
the paranormal were asked to read fabricated journal articles proving or disproving the
existence of ESP, believers were found to exhibit decreased recall for fabricated articles
that disproved ESP, whereas believers and skeptics demonstrated similar levels of recall
for those that proved ESP (Russell & Jones, 1980). Comparable patterns are also often
demonstrated in experiments in which participants are asked to view alleged psychic
demonstrations. When Jones and Russell (1980) had both believers and skeptics view a
pseudopsychic demonstration involving ESP cards with either a 60% or 20% hit rate,
with 20% being what would be expected through chance alone, both believers and
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skeptics who witnessed the successful demonstration were more likely to report that they
had witnessed a demonstration of psychic ability. However, when the pseudopsychic
demonstration exhibited a hit rate at chance levels, believers, but not skeptics, still
reported having witnessed a successful demonstration of psychic ability.
In similar experiments, Wiseman and Morris (1995) played videos of alleged
psychic demonstrations by a magician for both believers and skeptics, then asked them a
series of recall questions dealing with information that was either relevant or irrelevant to
how the tricks were performed; these demonstrations involved ESP cards and bending
cutlery by gently rubbing a given utensil. Unlike in Jones and Russell (1980), in
Wiseman and Morris (1995)’s experiments, believers generally rated the demonstrations
as more paranormal than skeptics despite the success of the alleged psychics, although
this difference was not always significant. When recall questions on either relevant or
irrelevant information indicating trickery were administered, skeptics tended to recall
more relevant information than believers. However, if participants were informed that
they had witnessed magic tricks immediately after the first recall task, as opposed to five
minutes later, then asked to perform a second recall task, both believers and skeptics
recalled relevant information at a similar level.
Furthermore, in direct investigations of memory intrusions, or false memories,
concerning not just relatively recent events such as a football game or a pseudopsychic
demonstration one has just viewed, but events dating back years or decades, prior beliefs
and opinions have been shown to once more play a role. Often researchers study memory
intrusions using impersonal word lists in a lab setting (Leding, 2011). However, it is not
uncommon for researchers to also attempt to create false memories in people for more
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meaningful, or at least more personal, events through a number of more complex,
potentially more ecologically valid methods (Berkowitz et al., 2008; Bernstein & Loftus,
2009; Desjardins & Scorbia, 2007; Frenda, Knowles, Saletan, & Loftus, 2013; Sacchi,
Agnoli, & Loftus, 2007; Strange, Hayne, & Garry, 2008; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay,
2002).
Falsified reports from the parents of participants containing self-relevant
information about participants have been used to create at least partial false memories
concerning a prank participants allegedly played on a teacher as a child (Desjardins &
Scoboria, 2007). News clippings describing fictitious accounts of a costumed Disney
theme park employee behaving appropriately or inappropriately around children have
been used to increase the confidence people reported in having been appropriately or
inappropriately licked by “Pluto” while visiting a Disney theme park as a child
(Berkowitz et al., 2008). The fabricated analyses of personality exams and food history
questionnaires have been used to alter food preferences within certain limits by
convincing people they had negative experiences with certain foods as children
(Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). Also, much has been done in recent years to create false
memories for both personal experiences and major political events through the digital
manipulation of both family photographs and images relating to historical events and
political figures (Frenda, Knowles, Saletan, & Loftus, 2013; Sacchi, Agnoli, & Loftus,
2007; Strange, Hayne, & Garry, 2008; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002).
One of the more well-known examples of using doctored photographs to induce
false memories involves taking an image of a person as a young child from a photograph
depicting an actual event and inserting that image of the person into a hot air balloon
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depicted in a separate photograph, possibly with a parent, as a means to stimulate the
creation of false memories. When presented in conjunction with the proper interview
techniques this specific manipulation to photographs can yield false memories in roughly
50 percent of participants, both in their late teens or twenties (Wade et al., 2002), and in
older children around the age of 10 (Strange et al., 2008).
With regard to creating false memories for events within historical or political
contexts through the digital manipulation of images, Sacchi et al. (2007) were able to
digitally alter an iconic image from Time magazine of a single student standing in front of
a line of tanks to make people remember larger crowds of protesters at that event, as well
as a photo of a well-known, peaceful, anti-war protest in Italy to make Italian participants
remember it as more violent. Also, Frenda et al. (2013) demonstrated that not only could
they use digitally altered photos involving famous American political figures to create or
alter memories for recent significant events in American politics, such as George Bush
hanging out with Roger Clemens at his Texas ranch while New Orleans was still in a
state of emergency following Hurricane Katrina or President Obama shaking hands with
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but that people tended to remember these
kinds of false events more frequently when they were congruent with their current
political beliefs. One hypothesis put forth by Frenda et al. (2013) for why beliefcongruence in terms of political ideology may influence the acceptance of doctored
images, and the subsequent occurrence of false memories in this way, was that it is easier
for people to accept new information concerning a person they dislike doing something
they disapprove of than a person they dislike doing something they approve of or a
person they like doing something they disapprove of, hence leading to a greater degree of
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perceived realism and imaginability for the occurrence. These findings are generally
consistent with and seem to potentially be an extension of the general pattern found in
motivated reasoning research that belief-congruence influence how people interpret new
information (Boysen & Vogel, 2007; Boysen & Vogel, 2008; Corner et al ., 2012; Jones
& Russell, 1980; Levine & Robinson, 1943; Lord, et al., 1984; Lordet al., 1979; Munro et
al., 2004; Plous, 1991), and can potentially be explained by notions that there may be
something not only emotionally, but also physiologically aversive about learning of a
favored political figure’s questionable actions (Westen et al., 2006).

Theoretical Explanations
Two frameworks often used to interpret both motivated reasoning and memory
research are dual processing theory and fuzzy-trace theory. Although there are many
versions of dual processing theory including Sloman (1996)’s associative and rule-based
form and a version by Epstein (1994) which attempts to establish an all-encompassing
framework for practically all psychological phenomena, according to the most basic
form, the mind processes information through two processes or systems. One is
automatic, quick, effortless, and used as a default. The other is effortful, requires focus
and attention, and comes less naturally (Kahneman, 2011). The former is heuristic
whereas the latter is analytic. According to dual process theory, it is predicted that beliefcongruent information will be processed analytically, and thus processed more deeply,
resulting in better memory for such information, whereas belief-incongruent information
will be processed heuristically, and thus not processed as deeply, resulting in poorer
recall for the information. Dual process theories would also predict that some forms of
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seductive details, such as superficial neurocognitive information, will be processed
heuristically, and repeated testing will compel individuals to process information more
analytically or deeply, thus resulting in better memory for that information; the
assumption here is that when new information is processed more deeply, it results in
greater cognitive activity relating to the information, which results in better memory for
the information.
Contrarily, there are other researchers who have studied memory for beliefcongruent and belief-incongruent information from a dual process perspective who would
put forth more nuanced hypotheses concerning the relationship between these variables.
For example Klaczynski and Robinson (2000) have postulated that unless individuals are
analytically oriented, they tend to process belief-congruent information heuristically,
attempting to assimilate the new information into their beliefs in an attempt to preserve
their theory, using stereotypes, memories, and intuition, whereas they process beliefincongruent information analytically, attempting to reject the new information through
various strategies that tend to be associated with scientific reasoning. Additionally, Blank
(2009) also suggests that memories and beliefs that form through heuristically processed
information are less stable than those processed analytically. Hence, it would follow that
new belief-congruent information would not be remembered as well as new beliefincongruent information. It would also be argued that information that is belief-congruent
would be more open to distortions or intrusions because it is being processed
heuristically, and that therefore new information that is belief-incongruent and processed
analytically would be remembered better, or at least be open to fewer distortions (Blank,
2009).
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Fuzzy-trace theory, like dual process theory, is also a broad attempt to explain
several major cognitive processes. In a basic form, fuzzy-trace theory, as described by
Titcomb and Reyna (1995), suggests that when new information is encoded, two memory
traces are formed. One is a verbatim trace, which, although not quite an exact cognitive
replica of all the information that could have been potentially encoded from a stimulus or
the environment, is still proposed to be detail oriented. The other is a gist trace, which
represents a more general representation or summary of stimuli or events. Verbatim
traces are believed to be forgotten relatively quickly, although not completely. Gist traces
are believed to be forgotten more slowly. With regard to memory intrusions, it is believed
that they are more likely to occur when they are consistent with current knowledge
structures or gist given that in such cases the misleading information is not necessarily
incongruent with one’s current beliefs or memories, or when new misleading information
is presented close to the time of recall given that in such instances the misleading
information would be competing with more accurate information at the time of recall.
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CHAPTER II
STUDY OVERVIEW

In the current study, several of the issues discussed above were examined more
closely. Specifically, an attempt was made to examine the role of belief-congruence in
memory, as well as the effect of superficial scientific information and repeated testing.
Specifically, the questions examined were as follows. (1) Is belief-congruent information
remembered better or worse than belief-incongruent information? (2) Does the addition
of superficial scientific information to belief-congruent or belief-incongruent information
influence how well the newly presented information is remembered? (3) Does repeated
testing have an effect on memory for the information? (4) Do any of these factors elicit a
greater number of memory intrusions in a free recall task?
These questions were examined using brief, fabricated, press release-style texts
that took a position, either for or against, a controversial topic, and were either
accompanied or not accompanied by superficial scientific information. The presentation
of these texts was followed by two free recall tasks. One occurred immediately after the
presentation of the text. The other occurred one week later. The use of fabricated texts,
superficial information, and retesting are common in research on motivated reasoning
(Anderson et al., 1980; Bastardi, et al., 2011; Corner et al., 2012; Lord et al., 1979;
Masnick & Zimmerman, 2009; Weisberg et al., 2008), seductive details (Harp & Mayer,
1998; Mayer et al., 2008; Rowland et al., 2008; Weisberg et al., 2008), and memory
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(Leding, 2011; Levine & Murphy, 1943; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006; Wiseman &
Morris, 1995).
The controversial topic used in this study was paranormal phenomena. The brief,
fabricated, texts described recent comprehensive reviews of hundreds of articles that
examined claims of the paranormal scientifically. There were four versions of the text.
Two supported claims of the paranormal and subsequently encouraged further scientific
investigation of paranormal topics; two did not support claims of the paranormal and
subsequently discouraged further scientific investigation of paranormal topics. One of
each type of article contained superficial scientific information, specifically, superficial
neurocognitive information. With regard to the free recall tests, as mentioned previously,
one was presented to participants right after reading one of the four texts; the other was
presented one week later.
The four texts were modeled upon those found in Zeigler, Walker, and Ackett
(2002), and informed by descriptions of rationales for paranormal beliefs and purported
bodies of evidence for paranormal phenomena found in Shermer (2011). Accuracy of
recall was evaluated using idea unit standards as described by Dunlosky, Hartwig,
Rawson, and Lipko (2010), as well as previously used by Roediger and Karpicke (2006).
The superficial scientific information used was neurocognitive in nature due to the
previously demonstrated ability of such information to elicit higher ratings for poor
explanations in fabricated scientific reports (Weisberg et al., 2008). The rationale behind
having participants perform a recall task on more than one occasion was that it has
previously been found that belief-incongruent information is forgotten more quickly
(Levine & Murphy, 1943). Also, it has been hypothesized that information deemed
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unimportant, either consciously or unconsciously, decays more quickly (Wiseman &
Morris, 1995), and it has been shown that repeated testing can enhance retention
(Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), as well as false recall (Leding, 2011). It should be noted,
however, that the false recall demonstrated by Leding (2011) was only shown in
individuals who scored higher on a measure of need for cognition, a measure of one’s
disposition towards effortful, elaborate information processing. For this reason
participants also filled out the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), which is designed
to measure tendencies towards rational and experiential thinking styles, and said to
improve upon older forms of similar scales by better balancing the number of questions
for each scale, as well as the positive vs. negative wording of scale items (Pacini &
Epstein, 1999).
With regard to the chosen controversial topic, it was a topic that presumably most
undergraduate participants had some familiarity with. Also, belief in the paranormal can
easily be measured using the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS), which has been
shown to demonstrate validity and reliability in assessing such beliefs (Tobacyk, 2004).
The hypotheses for the current study were as follows: (1) Given that the motivated
reasoning literature tends to show that the congruence of new information with one’s
beliefs, biases, and desires can cause an individual to rate the information more
positively, or as more obvious, more valid, or more methodologically sound, it was
hypothesized that such information would also be remembered better, and that beliefcongruence would lead to greater recall; this would also be consistent with prior findings
(Levine & Murphy, 1943; Wiseman & Morris, 1995). (2) Given that previous studies
have found that the presence of seductive details result in poorer memory for information
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not related to the added seductive details (Harp & Mayer, 1998) it was hypothesized that
the presence of superficial scientific information would decrease recall. (3) As for the
effects of repeated testing, it was predicted that retention would improve with repeated
testing, especially for belief congruent information. (4a) It was also predicted that there
would be increased memory intrusions for those with greater levels of paranormal belief
when exposed to belief-incongruent information, and (4b) that there would also be
increased memory intrusions for individuals with a tendency towards more rational styles
of thinking (e.g., need for cognition) on later tests. These predictions concerning repeated
testing and memory intrusions were informed by the work of Leding (2011), Levine and
Murphy (1943), Pacini and Epstein (1999), Roediger and Karpicke (2006), Russell and
Jones (1980), and Wiseman and Morris (1995).
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CHAPTER III
METHODS

Participants
Initial power calculations indicated that with a medium effect size (f = 0.25), with
alpha set at 0.05 and power at 0.8 for ANOVA the sample size needed = 184. Data were
collected for 249 individuals (46 male; 198 female; 5 sex not reported). Participants’
mean age was 19.38 years old (SD = 1.88). The ethnic composition of the sample was as
follows: 72.4% white-non-Hispanic, 10.8% black-non-Hispanic, 7.6% Hispanic, 3.6%
Asian/Pacific Islander, 3.2% other, 2.4% not reporting.
Data from nine participants needed to be excluded from all analyses due to their
failure to properly fill out one or more of the surveys provided to them. Data from an
additional 32 participants needed to be excluded from all analyses due to their failure to
properly read through all the materials provided to them as indicated by either explicitly
writing that they did not read or see the materials on the first memory test or leaving the
first memory test blank. Also, data from another 35 participants were excluded from
analyses involving data collected at the time two testing session due to their failure to
show up for the time two testing session.
Participants were Illinois State University undergraduate students who were at
least 18 years old. They were recruited using an electronic enrollment system that
required students to sign up for both testing sessions and later sent notifications to
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students via email prior to scheduled participation dates. In exchange for 60 minutes of
participation over the course of two 30 minute sessions they were compensated
withcourse credit or extra credit for a psychology course they were enrolled in at the time
of participation.

Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS)
The R-PBS (Appendix A), as described in Tobacyk (2004) is a measure of
paranormal belief that has demonstrated both validity and reliability (Test-retest
reliability for the full scale: α = .92 according to Tobacyk, 2004). It is an update of an
instrument developed by Tobacyk and Milford (1983), which was intended to evaluate
belief in several different types of phenomena that are considered incompatible with
science unless one or more basic scientific principles would be revised, and to base these
divisions between different types of phenomena in correlations of beliefs as opposed to
untested assumptions. Seven subscales are present; these include subscales for traditional
religious belief, psi, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms, and
precognition. Items (e.g., “The soul continues to exist though the body may die”) are
addressed using a seven point scale (1= Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree).

Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI)
The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Appendix B) is designed to measure
tendencies towards rational and experiential thinking styles, and said to improve upon
older forms of similar scales by better balancing the number of questions for each scale,
as well as the positive vs. negative wording of scale items. Validity and reliability
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(Rationality scale, α = .90; Experientiality scale, α = .87) have also been demonstrated.
Subscales for experiential engagement, experiential ability, rational engagement, and
rational ability are present. Items (e.g., “I don’t reason well under pressure”) are
addressed on a scale of one to five with one meaning “definitely not true of myself” and
five meaning “definitely true of myself” (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

Texts and Scoring
The four texts (Appendixes C-F), for or against paranormal phenomena, with or
without superficial neurocognitive information, as discussed previously, were modeled
upon those found in Zeigler et al. (2002), informed by descriptions of rationales for
paranormal beliefs and purported bodies of evidence for paranormal phenomena found in
Shermer (2011), and scored using idea unit standards as described by Dunlosky et al.
(2010), and used by Roediger and Karpicke (2006), as well as Dunlosky et al., (2010);
additional instructions were provided by Dunlosky (personal communication).
In essence, an idea unit is an intermediate conceptual unit of information that falls
between an atomic proposition, which is the smallest unit of information that still retains
some level of truth value, and a complex proposition, which has been described as
multiple atomic propositions contained within a single sentence (Dunlosky et al., 2010).
Idea units for these materials were created by two individuals who divided the texts into
idea units independently of one another before later comparing their divisions and
negotiating the final divisions. Scoring was carried out by two blind raters. Their average
intraclass correlation coefficient for time one recall was r = .86 and r = .827 for time two
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recall. Intrusions were scored in a similar manner using the same two blind raters,
although the intraclass coefficient for time one intrusions was only r = .529.

Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of up to 20. Informed consent was given by
participants after they read and signed an informed consent document. Participants were
informed that they would receive two packets. They were told that the first would contain
a demographics form, two assessments, and an article, but were not informed of the
contents of the second packet; with regard to the second packet, they were only notified
that they would receive it upon finishing with the first packet. Also, they were not
informed of the true nature of the study, the contents of the assessments or article, or that
the second packet would contain questions concerning the article that they were to read.
The reason for this was to recreate as best as possible a realistic scenario in which they
casually read a news article or blog post, and are then asked by a friend or colleague what
they had just read about and what they had read about one week later. After going
through this procedural overview with the researcher, participants were then given the
first packet.
Upon receiving the first packet, participants completed the demographic form,
then two questionnaires. The first, the R-PBS, evaluated their belief in various
paranormal phenomena using a seven-point scale for each question. The second, the REI,
evaluated their tendencies towards rational and experiential thinking styles using a fivepoint scale for each question.
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After filling out the R-PBS and the REI, participants read one of four versions of
a brief, fabricated, press release-style text. Two versions supported the existence of
paranormal phenomena; two versions did not. One of each version used superficial
neurocognitive information and one of each version did not use superficial
neurocognitive information.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four versions of the article.
Subsequently, some participants received an article that was congruent with their beliefs,
regardless of whether they believed in the paranormal or not, and some received an
article that did not agree with their current beliefs. Afterwards, they answered a question
concerning how persuasive they found the article they read.
Participants then had their materials collected and were given a free recall test in
which they were asked to recall as much information from their brief, fabricated, press
release-style text as they could. Afterwards, they were free to leave, but were asked to
return one week later to complete the same free recall task again. Participants were aware
of the second session upon initially signing up for the experiment but, again, were not
informed of what they would be doing during this second session until they arrived.
These recall procedures were similar to those previously implemented by Dunlosky et al.
(2011) and Roediger and Karpicke (2006). Upon completing the second free recall task,
participants were debriefed and given a second consent form. Those that did not return
for the second session were sent an email at the end of the semester with an attached copy
of the debriefing statement and a notification that if they did not request to have their data
from the first testing session excluded from the study via email, their data would be used
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in future analyses. All materials and procedures were reviewed and approved by Illinois
State University’s institutional review board.
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CHAPTER IV
STATISTICAL ANALYSES

Initially, a 2 (article stance: pro or con ) × 2 (belief-congruence: congruent or
incongruent) × 2 (seductive details: present or absent) × 2 (test: immediate and after one
week) mixed ANOVA was going to be performed to determine if belief-congruence,
seductive details, or test timing had an effect on free recall for new information
concerning the paranormal. Article stance, belief-congruence, and the presence of
seductive details were going to be analyzed as between-participant variables and test time
was going to be analyzed as a within-participant variable. The variable of beliefcongruence was going to be derived by taking the median of total R-PBS scores to
perform a median split, relegating individuals below the median to a “skeptic” category
and individuals above the median to a “believer” category, and then dividing them into
categories of “belief-congruent” and “belief-incongruent” based on whether the article
they received was congruent with their beliefs. Creating such quasi-independent variables
through the median split of a continuous variable has been done repeatedly in the past by
researchers examining the influence of paranormal belief on measures of attention,
perception, and memory (Jones & Russell, 1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman &
Morris, 1995), and similar procedures are also common within motivated reasoning
research wherein participants are often divided into “pro,” “con,” or “neutral” categories
based on their responses a single Likert question (Boysen & Vogel, 2007; Munro 2010)
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or their additive score on a larger multi
multi-item scale (Corner et al., 2012). However,
because the data collected for total R
R-PBS
PBS score was normally distributed (see
(
Figure 1),
using a median split to generate the categories of “believer” and “skeptic” or “congruent”
and “incongruent” could not be justified.

Figure 1: Distribution
bution of R
R-PBS Total
Therefore a 2 (article
article stance
stance: pro vs. con) × 2 (seductive
seductive details: present or absent)
absent
× 2 (test: immediate and after one week) mixed ANCOVA, with total R-PBS
PBS as a
continuous predictor variable
variable, was performed instead to determine if paranormal belief,
seductive details, or test timing have an effect on free recall for new information
concerning the paranormal
paranormal. Article stance and the presence of seductive details were
analyzed as between-participants
participants factors. Test time was analyzed as a repeated measures
factor. Total R-PBS score was analyzed as a continuous predictor variable as a means to
have it included in the ANOVA
ANOVA; given that R-PBS
PBS score was not influenced
influence by valence
F(1, 207) = .735, p = .392
392, ηp2 = .004, or seductive details F(1, 207) = .079
079, p = .779, ηp2
= .000 analyzing it in this way was deemed reasonable.
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An additional 2 (article stance: pro vs. con) × 2 (intrusions: time 1 and time 2)
mixed ANCOVA, with total R-PBS as a continuous predictor variable, was performed to
determine if paranormal belief or test timing have an effect on memory intrusions when
recalling new information concerning the paranormal. Article stance was analyzed as a
between-participants factor. Test timing was analyzed as a repeated measures factor.
Regression analyses were performed to examine the effects of the REI rationality
scale on intrusions.
Due to a large number of participants that failed to show up to the second testing
session, 2 (article stance: pro vs. con) × 2 (seductive details: present or absent)
ANCOVAs were also performed to examine the effects of paranormal belief and
seductive details on memory for new information concerning the paranormal and
memory intrusions when recalling new information concerning the paranormal at time
one alone. Once more, total R-PBS was included as a continuous predictor variable.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

The first hypothesis was that belief-congruent information would lead to higher
levels of recall than belief-incongruent information. As mentioned previously, because
data for total R-PBS scores were normally distributed, participants could not be divided
into “believers” and “skeptics” using a median split, and therefore the influence of beliefcongruence could not be examined. However, the influence of paranormal belief was
examined, although it had no significant effect on recall, F(1, 206) = .271, p = .604, ηp2 =
.002 (see Figure 2). For means and standard deviations, see Table 1.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Time 1 Recall

Valence
Negative

Seductive Details
No Seductive
Details
Seductive Details

Positive

Total

M
4.44

SD
2.84

N

3.47

2.22

59

Total
No Seductive
Details

3.91
5.35

2.55
3.57

107
54

Seductive Details

4.39

3.32

46

Total
No Seductive
Details

4.91
4.92

3.48
3.26

100
102

Seductive Details

3.88

2.78

105

Total

4.39

3.07

207

48

160
140
R-PBS Total

120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0

2

4

6

8
10
12
Idea Units Recalled

14

16

18

20

Figure 2: Influence of Paranormal Belief on Time 1 Recall
The second hypothesis was that the presence of seductive details would lead to poorer
recall for new information concerning the paranormal, regardless of level of belief or
article valence. This was demonstrated at the immediate free recall testing session F(1,
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207) = 5.268, p = .023, ηp2 = .025 (see Figure 3). Additionally, a marginal withinparticipants interaction was observed between the presence of seductive details and time
of testing, F(1, 173) = 3.462, p = .065, ηp2 = .02 (see Figure 4), revealing that although
participants that did not encounter seductive details in their article remembered more
when tested immediately after reading their article compared to those who did encounter
seductive details, participants in both conditions remembered equally little when tested
one week later. For means and standard deviations see Tables 1 and 2.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Recall, Time 1 and 2
Seductive Details
Valence
Recall Time 1 No Seductive Details Negative
Positive
Total
Seductive Details
Negative
Positive
Total
Total
Negative
Positive
Total
Recall Time 2 No Seductive Details Negative
Positive
Total
Seductive Details
Negative
Positive
Total
Total
Negative
Positive
Total
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M
4.52
5.41
4.97
3.85
4.47
4.13
4.18
4.98
4.55
2.14
2.39
2.26
1.91
2.42
2.14
2.02
2.40
2.20

SD
2.93
3.69
3.34
2.17
3.51
2.84
2.57
3.61
3.13
2.08
2.65
2.37
2.05
1.64
1.88
2.06
2.23
2.14

n
44
44
88
47
38
85
91
82
173
44
44
88
47
38
85
91
82
173

6
5

Idea Units

4
3
2
1
0

No Seductive Details

Seductive Details

Figure 3: Influence of Seductive Details on Time 1 Recall

6
5

Idea Units

4

No Seductive Details

3

Seductive Details
2
1
0

Time 1

Time 2

Figure 4: Influence of Seductive Details with Time

The third hypothesis was that repeated testing would enhance memory for new
information concerning the paranormal. This was not shown. Instead, the opposite effect
was demonstrated, with participants remembering significantly less when tested a second
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time one week after reading their article compared to when they were tested the first time
immediately after reading the article, F(1,173) = 10.670, p < .001, ηp2 = .06 (see Figure
5). For means and standard deviations see table 2.
6

5

Idea Units

4

3

2

Idea Units Recalled
Time 1

1

Idea Units Recalled
Time 2

0

No
Seductive
No
Seductive
Seductive Details Seductive Details
Details
Details
Supports

Negates

Figure 5: Influence of Time on Recall

The fourth hypothesis was that believers exposed to belief-incongruent
information would experience increased memory intrusions, as would those with more
rational thinking styles. However, once more hypotheses pertaining to belief-congruence
could not be analyzed due to the normal distribution of R-PBS scores. As for the role of
rational thinking style in memory intrusions, none was shown, F(1, 196)=.364, p =.547,
R2 = .002. Yet, additional analyses did reveal that seductive details led to fewer memory
intrusions, F(1,203)= 3.828, p =.052, ηp2 = .019 (see Figure 6). For means and standard
deviations see Table 3.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Intrusions, Time 1
Seductive
Valence Details
Negative No
Seductive
Details
Seductive
Details
Total
Positive No
Seductive
Details
Seductive
Details
Total
Total
No
Seductive
Details
Seductive
Details
Total

M

SD

n

4.44

2.84

48

3.47

2.22

59

3.91
5.35

2.55
3.57

107
54

4.39

3.32

46

4.91
4.92

3.48
3.263

100
102

3.88

2.78

105

4.39

3.07

207

0.35
0.3

Intrusions

0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0

No Seductive Details

Seductive Details

Figure 6: The Influence of Seductive Details on Time 1 Memory Intrusions
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Additionally, article valence was found to influence recall as well, with greater
recall occurring when articles were positively valenced, F(1, 207) = 4.566, p = .034, ηp2 =
.022 (see Figure 7). For means and standard deviations, see Table 1.

6
5

Idea Units

4
3
2
1
0

Positive

Negative

Figure 7: Influence of Valence on Time 1 Recall
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

Seductive Details
The strongest finding of the above study was the demonstration that seductive
details in the form of superficial neurocognitive information decreased recall for new
information when tested immediately after reading that information, but not one week
later, with both those who were and were not presented with seductive details
remembering equally little after one week. The finding that seductive details decrease
recall for new information is consistent with some prior studies (Harp & Mayer, 1998;
Rowland et al. 2008), but not others (Mayer et al., 2008; Rowland et al., 2008). One
possible reason for this might be due to the placement of the seductive details within the
texts presented to participants, as placement of seductive details has been found to
influence their effect. However, according to previous research, seductive details tend to
be most damaging if at the beginning of a text, as opposed to at the end (Rowland et al.,
2008), which is where the majority of the seductive details were placed in the articles
used in the above study, suggesting their influence may have been even stronger if they
appeared earlier in the article.
Furthermore, given the placement of the seductive details in this study, and the
finding that they had an effect on recall, it seems more likely that they exerted their effect
by disrupting the organization and integration of new information into a coherent mental
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model, as described by Mayer et al. (2008), than by priming participants to organize what
they were about to learn around irrelevant prior knowledge, which appears to have
occurred in the work of Harp and Mayer (1998). Additionally, it is worth noting that this
study not only demonstrated that seductive details reduce memory for the information
they are intermixed with, but for false memories, or memory intrusions, as well. One
reason for this is that memory intrusions may be inferences stemming from gist memory
representations and that if seductive details mitigate the amount of information
remembered at the gist level, people may have less internalized information to use when
developing false memories. However, whether these intrusions truly did stem from gist
memory representations as opposed to verbatim ones is difficult to report with certainty
given that efforts were not made to experimentally examine the nature of the intrusions at
this level. It is only inferred here that they may stem from gist representations due to the
suggestion put forth by Titcomb and Reyna (1995) that gist memories increase false
memories based on new information that is inaccurate but consistent with gist
representations.

Belief-Congruence
As for the role of belief-congruence in memory for new information concerning
the paranormal, this variable could not properly be evaluated given that the data collected
via the R-PBS as a means to initially measure paranormal belief were normally
distributed, therefore providing no basis for the use of a median split to divide
participants into “believers” and “skeptics,” and subsequently those receiving “beliefcongruent” or “belief-incongruent” information. Additionally, when R-PBS scores were
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analyzed as part of an ANCOVA, paranormal belief was not shown to have any influence
on recall. Together with the normal distribution of RPBS scores, these findings may
provide some reason to call into question what seem like standard practices of performing
a median split (Jones & Russell, 1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman & Morris, 1995)
or using a single Likert question to create quasi-independent variables in this kind of
research (Boysen & Vogel, 2007; Munro 2010).
In the past the creation of such quasi-independent variables through the median
split of the total score of a multi-question scale measuring one’s level of belief in a given
phenomenon has been done in research concerning both paranormal belief (Jones &
Russell, 1980; Russell & Jones, 1980; Wiseman & Morris, 1995) and the acceptance of
climate change (Corner et al., 2012). Similarly, researchers have derived categorical
variables from continuous data by asking participants a relatively small number of direct
questions concerning their attitudes or behaviors in relation to a topic, cause, or group to
create “pro-”, “anti-”, and “neutral” categories when researching biased assimilation and
attitude polarization when encountering new information about marginalized groups such
as homosexuals or the mentally ill, or contentious socio-scientific topics like the
development and implementation of nuclear technologies (Boysen & Vogel, 2007;
Boysen & Vogel, 2008; Munro, 2010; Plous 1991).
However, these methods of creating quasi-independent variables may not always
be warranted, especially in the absence of a sufficient number of people with extreme
attitudes concerning the topic of interest. Some have even argued that even under such
circumstances the dichotomization of a continuous variable is still not warranted due to
the resulting loss of information concerning individual differences and linear
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relationships, alterations of effect size and power, and decreases in reliability
(MacCullum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). Yet, even if these undesirable effects
could be shown to be minimal when creating quasi-independent variables in a study of
motivated reasoning and biased assimilation, the results yielded from subsequent
analyses may still be attenuated if respondents lack conviction in their beliefs or are not
personally active in an organization concerned with the topic or cause the newly
presented information concerns (Plous, 1991). One potential reason for the attenuation of
these effects is that if a topic is of little importance to an individual, a challenge to a
belief they may casually hold concerning the topic presumably would not present a
challenge to their sense of self, their sense of reality, or their self-esteem, and therefore
would fail to produce the heightened emotional arousal described by Russell and Jones
(1980) when the beliefs of some participants concerning the paranormal were threatened,
the increased activation of areas of the brain associated with pain and punishment
demonstrated by Westen et al. (2006) when participants were presented with negative
portrayals of favored politicians, or the ego-protective processes hypothesized by
Klaczynski and Narasimham (1998).
To cope with these kinds of potential problems, some researchers have
consequently directly recruited students at their universities known for their extreme
opinions on a topic of interest (Levine & Murphy, 1943) or targeted organizations likely
to attract individuals with extreme opinions (Plous, 1991). For example, when examining
biased assimilation and attitude polarization for new information regarding technological
breakdowns related to nuclear weapons and energy, Plous sought participants from a
population of ROTC cadets, as well as staff members of the peace organizations Beyond
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War and Physicians for Social Responsibility. Considering that the standard college
sample used in the study reported here yielded such normally distributed levels of
paranormal belief as discerned from the collected R-PBS scores, it may be worthwhile for
future researchers to seek out individuals with more extreme opinions concerning the
paranormal such as attendees of a skeptic’s meetup or paranormal convention when
evaluating the role of paranormal belief in recall for belief-congruent and beliefincongruent information concerning the paranormal.

Repeated Testing
A less surprising finding was that contrary to initial predictions, recall
significantly declined between testing at time one immediately after reading the article
and at time two one week later. In retrospect, unlike the studies that informed the
prediction that repeated testing would lead to better recall (Dunlosky et al., 2010;
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), participants, despite being told to read the article they were
given, were never explicitly told to study it or given any indication that they would be
asked about it in the future. However, once more, the reason for not doing so was to
attempt to create a fairly realistic scenario in which a person casually reads an article or
blog post, and then is asked about it by a friend or colleague upon finishing, and again
one week later.

Memory Intrusions
With regard to memory intrusions, the only factor that seemed to influence their
occurrence was that of seductive details, which led to a decrease in their frequency.
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Paranormal belief had no effect on memory intrusions, possibly because of the lack of
participants with high levels of belief in the sample that was used. Rationality scores did
not have an effect on memory intrusions either, however it should be noted that a number
of participants only answered using the extreme ends of the Likert scale when filling out
the REI. When this was first noticed well into the process of collecting data, an
examination of the wording of the instructions for filling out the REI revealed some
ambiguity in whether those filling it out should treat individual questions as dichotomous
or continuous. Although the majority of participants correctly treated the questions as
continuous, if enough of them treated the questions as dichotomous, this may have had an
impact on analyses involving this measure.

Valence
Initially, article valence was not a variable intended to be examined directly
through this study, but to aid in determining the influence of belief-congruence.
However, because levels of belief in the paranormal were normally distributed within our
sample, this could not be done. Nevertheless, valence was analyzed and was shown to
have an influence on recall with positively valenced articles eliciting greater recall than
negatively valenced ones.
Although it does not appear the effects of valence have been studied much in the
context of memory for potentially controversial information, studies pertaining to the
interpretation of new scientific information have shown that despite being able to
distinguish between an accurate scientific finding and an inaccurate scientific finding
with some level of accuracy (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2001), the majority of
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people will tend to agree with statements they read as true, that knowledge of the
outcome of a study increases perceptions of an outcome’s obviousness, that people will
rate practically any reasonable statement as obvious, that people will not always reliably
choose an actual finding over its opposite, and that people tend to rate findings they
choose over alternatives as more obvious regardless of whether they are right or wrong
(Gage, 1991; Wong, 1996). Furthermore, it appears that there is a more general trend
across different bodies of research suggesting that negatively valenced words and
statements are more difficult to process at least in some contexts (Gotoh, Kikuchi, &
Olofsson, 2010; Macbeth et al., 2014), with researchers suggesting that mere
comprehension of a statement leads to its subsequent acceptance, and that its rejection
requires an additional process (Harris et al., 2008), thus resulting in the observed
influence of valence on cognitive functioning.

General Discussion
Once more the most prominent findings of this study concerned the influence of
seductive details. Here they were found to decrease recall when memory was tested
immediately after the presentation of the new information accompanied by seductive
details. However, the effect was no longer present one week later. Additionally, the
presence of seductive details also reduced the number of memory intrusions reported by
participants.
As for the effects of belief-congruence and retesting on memory for new
information concerning the paranormal, and rational thinking style on memory intrusions,
no significant results were found, potentially due to some of the issues discussed above.
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Belief-congruence could not be properly evaluated due to the lack of participants with
extreme opinions concerning the existence of paranormal phenomena. In an attempt to
create a realistic scenario, participants were told to read, but not told to study, the
information they were presented with. The wording of the scale measuring thinking style
may have misled some participants to fill it out as if its questions were dichotomous as
opposed to continuous. However, there are also some more general concerns pertaining to
the study as a whole.
As with many psychological studies, there are questions regarding how
representative a sample of largely white, female, psychology majors in their late teens
and early twenties truly is of the larger population. In recent years, this common practice
of generalizing from such a subpopulation of Western, educated, industrialized, rich,
democratic societies by social and cognitive scientists has been called into question
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Also, effect sizes for the findings reported in this
study tended to be small, making the large number of participants whose data needed to
be excluded from analyses due to failure to properly fill out the R-PBS, read the article,
or show up for time two even more unfortunate. Whether these problems with
participants were due to the procedure of filling out two surveys, reading an article, and
doing a free recall task being too tedious for some participants, whether they found the
topic to be of no interest to them, or whether these participants just did not care or take
the task seriously remains unknown. Another possibility is that since students were
allowed to work through the tasks at their own rate in a group setting, some may have felt
pressured to keep up with those that finished most quickly, even though these students
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may have remembered the least amount of information or may have rushed through the
task.
In performing future studies, it would be wise to attempt to better control for or
reduce some of the basic methodological concerns described above. However, there are
four directions for future studies that I believe could potentially be far more enlightening,
assuming the basic methodological problems could be effectively dealt with. The first
would be to examine the effect of the placement of seductive details in the articles on
memory, given that the findings reported here are consistent with one of the standard
effects of seductive details (Harp & Mayer, 1998), although not the with later studies that
examined the role of their placement more closely (Roland et al., 2008). The second
would be to use a continuous, multi-question measure such as the R-PBS in a study of
motivated reasoning as opposed to the more standard two or three direct questions used in
those types of studies. The third would be to conduct the same study as that which was
performed here, but, when doing so, encourage students to study the text they receive as
opposed to just reading it. The fourth would be to conduct the study performed here, as
well as those suggested in this paragraph, using samples of more extreme skeptics and
believers.
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APPENDIX A
REVISED PARANORMAL BELIEF SCALE (R-PBS; TOBACYK, 2004)
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale
________________________________________________________________________
Please put a number next to each item to indicate how much you agree or disagree with
that item. Use the
numbers as indicated below. There are no right or wrong answers. This is a sample of
your own beliefs and attitudes. Thank you.
1=Strongly Disagree 2=Moderately Disagree 3=Slightly Disagree
4=Uncertain 5=Slightly Agree 6=Moderately Agree 7=Strongly Agree
1. The soul continues to exist though the body may die.
2. Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces.
3. Black magic really exists.
4. Black cats can bring bad luck.
5. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection).
6. The abominable snowman of Tibet exists.
7. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future.
8. There is a devil.
9. Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist.
10. Witches do exist.
11. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck.
12. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
13. The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists.
14. The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future.
15. I believe in God
16. A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object.
17. Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to cast spells on persons.
18. The number “13” is unlucky.
19. Reincarnation does occur.
20. There is life on other planets.
21. Some psychics can accurately predict the future.
22. There is a heaven and a hell.
23. Mind reading is not possible.
24. There are actual cases of witchcraft.
25. It is possible to communicate with the dead.
26. Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future.
__________________________
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_________________________________________________________
Note. Item 23 is reverse scored. Traditional Religious Belief = Mean of Items (1, 8, 15,
22);
Psi = Mean of Items (2, 9, 16, 23); Witchcraft = Mean of Items (3, 10, 17, 24);
Superstition = Mean of Items (4, 11, 18); Spiritualism = Mean of Items (5, 12, 19, 25)
Extraordinary Life Forms = Mean of Items (6, 13, 20); Precognition = Mean of Items (7,
14, 21, 26).
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APPENDIX B
RATIONAL EXPERIENTIAL INVENTORY (REI; PACINI & EPSTEIN, 1999)
1 = Definitely Not True of Myself, 5 = Definitely True of Myself
1. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
2. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems.
3. I enjoy intellectual challenges.
4. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis.
5. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking.
6. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.
7. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.
8. I am not a very analytical thinker.
9. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.
10. I prefer complex problems to simple problems.
11. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
12. I don't reason well under pressure.
13. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
14. I have a logical mind.
15. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
16. I have no problem thinking things through carefully.
17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
18. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good
enough for me.
19. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
20. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.
21. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
22. I don't have a very good sense of intuition.
23. Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my
life.
24. I believe in trusting my hunches.
25. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.
26. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
27. I trust my initial feelings about people.
28. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
29. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.
30. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.
31. I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition.
32. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.
33. I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions.
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34. I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
35. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.
36. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as
intuitive.
37. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's.
38. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
39. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I
know.
40. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate.
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APPENDIX C
SUPPORTS WITHOUT NEUROCOGNITIVE JARGON
Reprinted with permission from Science & Technology News Weekly, August 6, 2011
RESEARCH NEWS
REPORT SUPPORTS CLAIMS OF PARANORMAL PHENOMENA
(UPI) A report recently released by The Oxford Institute of Consciousness Studies
indicates that paranormal phenomena are not only real, but that researchers would be
wise to consider such lines of inquiry as we move further into the twenty first century. In
a comprehensive review of experiments from over 100 universities and research centers,
it was reported that over 300 recent studies conducted since 2009 support claims of the
paranormal. Among the phenomena supported are ESP, collective consciousness, and
out of body experiences. Director of the National Institutes of Health, Francis Collins,
called the report “A convincing review supporting the supernatural as legitimate
scientific research.”
Among the most significant findings the review reported are:
Participants knowing when a friend in another room was thinking about them;
The psychic transmission of mental images of photographs and video images to
individuals in another room;
The validity of out of body experiences.
According to the Institute’s report, the studies examined were methodologically sound,
well controlled, and had statistically significant findings when the proper analyses were
performed. The report’s head author, Dr. Randy Weiss, sympathized with skeptics of
paranormal research, but concluded “Although some would like to think that such
phenomena are not possible, current research suggests otherwise.”
2011 United Features Syndicate
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APPENDIX D
REFUTES WITHOUT NEUROCOGNITIVE JARGON
Reprinted with permission from Science & Technology News Weekly, August 6, 2011
RESEARCH NEWS
REPORT REFUTES CLAIMS OF PARANORMAL PHENOMENA
(UPI) A report recently released by The Oxford Institute of Consciousness Studies
indicates that paranormal phenomena are not only false, but that researchers would be
foolish to consider such lines of inquiry as we move further into the twenty first century.
In a comprehensive review of experiments from over 100 universities and research
centers, it was reported that over 300 recent studies conducted since 2009 refute claims
of the paranormal. Among the phenomena refuted are ESP, collective consciousness, and
out of body experiences. Director of the National Institutes of Health, Francis Collins,
called the report “A convincing review refuting the supernatural as legitimate scientific
research.”
Among the most significant phenomena the review discredited are:
Participants knowing when a friend in another room was thinking about them;
The psychic transmission of mental images of photographs and video images to
individuals in another room;
The validity of out of body experiences.
According to the Institute’s report, the studies examined were methodologically sound,
well controlled, and had statistically significant findings when the proper analyses were
performed. The report’s head author, Dr. Randy Weiss, sympathized with proponents of
paranormal research, but concluded “Although some would like to think that such
phenomena are possible, current research suggests otherwise.”
2011 United Features Syndicate
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APPENDIX E
SUPPORTS WITH NEUROCOGNITIVE JARGON
Reprinted with permission from Science & Technology News Weekly, August 6, 2011
RESEARCH NEWS
REPORT SUPPORTS CLAIMS OF PARANORMAL PHENOMENA
(UPI) A report recently released by The Oxford Institute of Neurocognitive Studies
indicates that paranormal phenomena are not only real, but that researchers would be
wise to consider such lines of inquiry as we move further into the twenty first century. In
a comprehensive review of experiments from over 100 universities and research centers,
it was reported that over 300 recent studies conducted since 2009 support claims of the
paranormal. Among the phenomena supported are ESP, quantum consciousness, and out
of body experiences. Director of the National Institutes of Health, Francis Collins, called
the report “A convincing review supporting the supernatural as legitimate scientific
research.”
Among the most significant findings the review reported are:
Participants synchronizing their brainwaves with those of a friend in another room;
The psychic transmission of mental images of photographs and video images to
individuals in another room through the activation of the receiver’s occipital cortex;
The separation of consciousness from the brain during out of body experiences.
The studies examined looked at increases in event related potentials in neurons, elevated
baseline α-waves, and increased activity in the Shaw nucleus of the anterior cingulate
when alleged paranormal phenomena were being tested. According to the Institute’s
report, these studies were methodologically sound, well controlled, and had statistically
significant findings when the proper analyses were performed. The report’s head author,
Dr. Randy Weiss, sympathized with skeptics of paranormal research, but concluded
“Although some would like to think that such phenomena are not possible, current
research suggests otherwise.”
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APPENDIX F
REFUTES WITH NEUROCOGNITIVE JARGON
Reprinted with permission from Science & Technology News Weekly, August 6, 2011
RESEARCH NEWS
REPORT REFUTES CLAIMS OF PARANORMAL PHENOMENA
(UPI) A report recently released by The Oxford Institute of Neurocognitive Studies
indicates that paranormal phenomena are not only false, but that researchers would be
foolish to consider such lines of inquiry as we move further into the twenty first century.
In a comprehensive review of experiments from over 100 universities and research
centers, it was reported that over 300 recent studies conducted since 2009 refute claims
of the paranormal. Among the phenomena refuted are ESP, quantum consciousness and
out of body experiences. Director of the National Institutes of Health, Francis Collins,
called the report “A convincing review refuting the supernatural as legitimate scientific
research.”
Among the most significant phenomena the review discredited are:
Participants synchronizing their brainwaves with those of a friend in another room;
The psychic transmission of mental images of photographs and video images to
individuals in another room through the activation of the receiver’s occipital cortex;
The separation of consciousness from the brain during out of body experiences.
The studies examined looked at increases in event related potentials in neurons, elevated
baseline α-waves, and increased activity in the Shaw nucleus of the anterior cingulate
when alleged paranormal phenomena were being tested. According to the Institute’s
report, these studies were methodologically sound, well controlled, and had statistically
significant findings when the proper analyses were performed. The report’s head author,
Dr. Randy Weiss, proponents of paranormal research, but concluded “Although some
would like to think that such phenomena are possible, current research suggests
otherwise.”
2011 United Features Syndicate
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APPENDIX G
SUPPORTS WITHOUT NEUROCOGNITIVE JARGON (WITH IDEA UNITS)
Reprinted with permission / from Science & Technology News Weekly, / August 6, 2011
/ RESEARCH NEWS
REPORT SUPPORTS CLAIMS / OF PARANORMAL PHENOMENA
(UPI) / A report recently released / by The Oxford Institute of Consciousness Studies /
indicates that paranormal phenomena are not only real, / but that researchers would be
wise to consider / such lines of inquiry / as we move further into the twenty first century.
/ In a comprehensive review / of experiments / from over 100 universities / and research
centers, / it was reported / that over 300 recent studies / conducted since 2009 / support
claims of the paranormal. / Among the phenomena supported / are ESP, / collective
consciousness, / and out of body experiences. / Director of the National Institutes of
Health, / Francis Collins, / called the report / “A convincing review / supporting the
supernatural / as legitimate scientific research.”
/Among the most significant findings the review reported are: /
Participants knowing / when a friend / in another room / was thinking about them;
The psychic transmission / of mental images / of photographs / and video images / to
individuals / in another room;
The validity of out of body experiences.
According to the Institute’s report, / the studies examined were / methodologically sound,
/ well controlled, / and had statistically significant findings / when the proper analyses
were performed. / The report’s head author, / Dr. Randy Weiss, / sympathized with
skeptics of paranormal research, / but concluded /“Although some would like to think /
that such phenomena are not possible, / current research suggests otherwise.”
2011 / United Features Syndicate
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APPENDIX H
REFUTES WITHOUT NEUROCOGNITIVE JARGON (WITH IDEA UNITS)
Reprinted with permission from Science & Technology News Weekly, August 6, 2011
RESEARCH NEWS
REPORT REFUTES CLAIMS / OF PARANORMAL PHENOMENA
(UPI) / A report recently released / by The Oxford Institute of Consciousness Studies /
indicates that paranormal phenomena are not only false,/ but that researchers would be
foolish to consider / such lines of inquiry / as we move further into the twenty first
century. / In a comprehensive review / of experiments from over 100 universities / and
research centers, / it was reported / that over 300 recent studies / conducted since 2009 /
refute claims of the paranormal. / Among the phenomena refuted / are ESP, / collective
consciousness, / and out of body experiences. / Director of the National Institutes of
Health, / Francis Collins, / called the report / “A convincing review / refuting the
supernatural / as legitimate scientific research.”
/Among the most significant phenomena the review discredited are:/
Participants knowing / when a friend / in another room / was thinking about them;
The psychic transmission/ of mental images /of photographs/ and video images/ to
individuals / in another room;
The validity of out of body experiences.
According to the Institute’s report,/ the studies examined were / methodologically sound,
/well controlled, /and had statistically significant findings/ when the proper analyses were
performed./ The report’s head author,/ Dr. Randy Weiss, /sympathized with proponents
of paranormal research,/ but concluded/ “Although some would like to think/ that such
phenomena are possible,/ current research suggests otherwise.”
2011/ United Features Syndicate
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APPENDIX I
SUPPORTS WITH NEUROCOGNITIVE JARGON (WITH IDEA UNITS)
Reprinted with permission from Science & Technology News Weekly, August 6, 2011
RESEARCH NEWS
REPORT SUPPORTS/ CLAIMS OF PARANORMAL PHENOMENA
(UPI)/ A report recently released/ by The Oxford Institute of Neurocognitive Studies/
indicates that paranormal phenomena are not only real,/ but that researchers would be
wise/ to consider such lines of inquiry/ as we move further into the twenty first century. /
In a comprehensive review / of experiments/ from over 100 universities/ and research
centers,/ it was reported/ that over 300 recent studies/ conducted since 2009/ support
claims of the paranormal./ Among the phenomena supported/ are ESP,/ quantum
consciousness,/ and out of body experiences. Director of the National Institutes of
Health,/ Francis Collins,/ called the report/ “A convincing review/ supporting the
supernatural/ as legitimate scientific research.”
/Among the most significant findings the review reported are:/
Participants synchronizing their brainwaves/ with those of a friend/ in another room;
The psychic transmission/ of mental images/ of photographs/ and video images/ to
individuals/ in another room/ through the activation/ of the receiver’s occipital cortex;
The separation of consciousness/ from the brain/ during out of body experiences.
The studies examined looked at/ increases in event related potentials/ in neurons,/
elevated baseline α-waves,/ and increased activity in the Shaw nucleus/ of the anterior
cingulate/ when alleged paranormal phenomena were being tested./ According to the
Institute’s report,/ these studies were/ methodologically sound,/ well controlled,/ and had
statistically significant findings/ when the proper analyses were performed./ The report’s
head author,/ Dr. Randy Weiss,/ sympathized with skeptics of paranormal research,/ but
concluded/ “Although some would like to think/ that such phenomena are not possible,/
current research suggests otherwise.”
2011/ United Features Syndicate
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APPENDIX J
REFUTES WITH NEUROCOGNITIVE JARGON (WITH IDEA UNITS)
Reprinted with permission/ from Science & Technology News Weekly,/ August 6, 2011/
RESEARCH NEWS
REPORT REFUTES CLAIMS/ OF PARANORMAL PHENOMENA
(UPI)/ A report recently released/ by The Oxford Institute of Neurocognitive Studies/
indicates that paranormal phenomena are not only false,/ but that researchers would be
foolish to consider/ such lines of inquiry/ as we move further into the twenty first
century./ In a comprehensive review/ of experiments/ from over 100 universities/ and
research centers,/ it was reported/ that over 300 recent studies/ conducted since 2009/
refute claims of the paranormal./ Among the phenomena refuted/ are ESP,/ quantum
consciousness/ and out of body experiences./ Director of the National Institutes of
Health,/ Francis Collins,/ called the report/ “A convincing review/ refuting the
supernatural/ as legitimate scientific research.”
Among the most significant phenomena the review discredited are:
Participants synchronizing their brainwaves/ with those of a friend/ in another room;
The psychic transmission/ of mental images/ of photographs/ and video images/ to
individuals/ in another room/ through the activation/ of the receiver’s occipital cortex;
The separation of consciousness/ from the brain/ during out of body experiences.
The studies examined looked at/ increases in event related potentials/ in neurons,/
elevated baseline α-waves,/ and increased activity in the Shaw nucleus/ of the anterior
cingulate/ when alleged paranormal phenomena were being tested./ According to the
Institute’s report,/ these studies were/ methodologically sound,/ well controlled,/ and had
statistically significant findings/ when the proper analyses were performed./ The report’s
head author,/ Dr. Randy Weiss,/ sympathized with proponents of paranormal research,/
but concluded/ “Although some would like to think/ that such phenomena are possible,/
current research suggests otherwise.”
2011/ United Features Syndicate
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